(after 1848) as well as the EU were conceived as free internal markets (Lévy, 2007; Cini and Borragan, 2013) . Political union also played a historical role in both, but in an inverted sequence. Whereas Switzerland formed a political union in 1848 in order to create a common market, the EU created a common market in order to create political union further down the road. And even this remote goal has never been commonly agreed upon.
The background condition of diversity is similar in the two political projects of Switzerland and the EU, and there is much reticence from the diverse territories to delegate powers to the federal (i.e., supranational) level. Swiss federalism has always been anti-centralism (Lüthy, 1971, p. 31; Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008, p. 4) . The conflicts surrounding the Lisbon Treaty and recent crisis management illustrate the same tendency in the EU. Yet, Switzerland has managed to accommodate diversity (Linder, 2010) . The EU, on the other hand, faces major challenges of disintegration today.
Democratisation, Liberalisation and Political Integration
Comparing the political integration of Switzerland and the EU raises the question of what phases to compare. If one chooses the Swiss post-1848 phase and the post-1957 phase of the EU, one compares two different kinds of political entities: a federal state in the case of Switzerland and a treaty system in the case of the EU. In order to respect the categories, one should compare Swiss integration during the confederal phase (1291-1848) with the corresponding phase of the EU (1957 and onwards) . But such a choice would be too formalistic. Switzerland remained a political integration project after 1848. The EU, on the other hand, contains several federal-state elements that the Swiss Confederation only acquired after 1848, such as a parliament with important competencies, legislation with direct effect, exclusive competencies and so on. An overlapping comparison of confederal and federal-state Switzerland with the EU is therefore justified.
For the Swiss Confederacy, the last phase before the federal-state constitution of 1848 was conflictive and moderately violent, and development was non-linear. After the occupation of Switzerland by Napoleon, the confederation was transformed into a central state (the Helvetic Republic) in 1798. Top-down political engineering merged sovereign cantons into new administrative entities. The result was a dysfunctional system, abolished five years later. The 1803 Act of Mediation restored the cantons and abolished the central state, and Switzerland became a confederation once again. The Federal Treaty of 1815 confirmed this restorative process.
The Federal Diet (council of cantonal representatives) was again the only governmental institution of the Swiss Confederacy. It had executive and legislative powers for common matters and practised intergovernmental centralism, similar to the current EU crisis management.
After 1830, and in the broader context of liberal revolutions in Europe and Latin America, Switzerland entered a 'regenerative' phase. In 1831, several cantons, some Catholic, adopted liberal constitutions ending serfdom, introducing freedom of contract and freedom of press, recognising the sovereignty of the people and granting universal male suffrage. Large informal assemblies driven by civil society and embodied in the Radical Party attempted to take this process of democratisation and liberalisation to all cantons and to the confederal level. This push for reform was supposed to be confirmed in 1833 by a new federal constitution. But the attempt failed, and it exacerbated the cleavages with the conservative antifederalists. In 1845, the confrontation between federalists and anti-federalists culminated in the Sonderbund, an internal alliance of the conservative cantons with foreign connections and as such forbidden by the 1815 Federal Treaty. This in turn led to the 1847 civil war (Sonderbundskrieg), in which the Sonderbund forces were defeated without a major battle and with roughly 100-130 human casualties. Switzerland adopted a liberal federal-state constitution in 1848.
With the exception of the right to initiate a total revision of the constitution, it contained no element of direct democracy. Up to the 1860s, direct or semi-direct democracy was only practised in the conservative cantons; many of them had belonged to the Sonderbund, many of them were antifederalist before 1848 and reluctantly federalist after 1848. In the 1860s, other cantons adopted semi-direct democratic instruments (facultative and/or mandatory referendum, initiative). These reform measures were driven by popular petitions and memoranda to change the cantonal constitutions. Only this process at the cantonal level enabled the introduction of the facultative referendum at the federal level in 1874 and the introduction of the constitutional initiative in 1891 (Auer, 1996; Adler, 2006) . The semi-direct democratic instruments at the federal level were meant to be procedural confidence-building measures to better integrate the conservative and anti-federalist minorities into the Swiss federal state and to overcome the old political cleavages that continued to divide the Swiss federal state after 1848. It took a very long time to mend the fault lines between federalists and anti-federalists. Eight out of 22 cantons rejected the constitution of 1848 with strong majorities of over 80%, and some cantons did not adapt their cantonal constitutions to the federal constitution for several decades. The vote on the new constitution of 1874, introducing the facultative referendum at the federal level, did not do any The autonomy of the communes, a federalist constitutional system recognising the sovereignty of cantons as constitutionalised peoples, free and fair elections of government in all cantons and at the federal level, the development of direct democracy at all levels of political integration and in all political units of the country, and in more recent times federal welfare state institutions, all played an important role in overcoming disunion. Anti-centralistic federalism and direct democratic procedures, purely formal and institutional in nature, are today identity markers of Switzerland. The development of a coherent practice of direct democracy at all levels emerged in a time span roughly between 1830 and 1891, and it played a crucial role in mending the political union of Switzerland at the federal-state level. Switzerland made direct democracy as much as direct democracy made Switzerland.
Contrary to Switzerland, the EU has been advancing much more rapidly in terms of economic and political integration. After the disasters of the Second World War, the idea that there should be a union among European countries took force. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed. It created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with the goal of merging coal and steel industries. In 1957, the same group of countries that had established the European Economic Community (the EEC, essentially a customs union) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) signed the Treaty of Rome, which established a common Assembly and Courts for all members of the Treaty, the first institutional structures at the European level. The 1967 Merger Treaty combined the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom and created a common set of institutions for all: the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission. In 1979, the first direct elections of the European Parliament took place. The signing of treaties proceeded at an even faster pace after this event. In 1985, the Schengen Agreement abolished passport controls between some member and non-member states. In 1986, the important Single European Act was signed. The year 1993 saw the formal establishment of the EU as a political union by the Maastricht Treaty and the change of name to European Community from the former EEC. The Common Currency was introduced in 2002 with 12 member countries; it has since grown to 19 members. In high frequency compared to former periods of integration, It merged the three pillars of the EU into a single legal entity and legal personality, created the post of a President of the European Council and strengthened EU foreign policy with the post of the High Representative.
This schematic view of European integration emphasises the short time span that included the EEC being born and transforming into a quasipolitical union. Figure 1 .1 represents the distinct evolution of the integration processes of Switzerland and the EU over time, showing the main events in each case. Although we are aware that duration is not strictly comparable due to the change of transportation and communication technology leading to a plasticity of time, the speed of the EU integration process is remarkable. In a little over 50 years, a completely new system was created and gradually transformed into an economic and political union.
The Speed of Accession
Between 1513 and 1803, the Swiss Confederation remained stable regarding membership of confederate units. The 1798 Helvetic Republic led to territorial expansion and the 1803 Act of Mediation constituted an accession of six new members, as a result of which the Swiss territory grew by roughly 50%. In 1815 three new members joined (Geneva, Neuchâtel, Valais) and the territory grew by another 10%. The process to federal state integration between 1815 and 1848 happened during a time with no accession of member states. 2 At its foundation in 1957, the EEC had six member states, a territory of 1,299,536m 2 and a total population of 169, 106, 736 This short description of the territorial and population expansion of the EU as compared to Switzerland reveals again that EU enlargement was much greater and was conducted at a much faster pace. Figure 1 .2 summarises this fact. Bars in the figure represent the number of cantons (light grey) and of member states (dark grey); the areas represent the percentage increase of the population (Switzerland in beige and the EU in grey).
Increase in Diversity
The main diversification of the old Swiss Confederacy was religious and happened during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, that is, between 1519 (Reformation in Zurich) and 1712 (Second Villmerger War). It was a time of religious wars among the confederates. The second diversification was linguistic. It was a relatively recent phenomenon given the total history of the confederation. The first bilingual canton to join was Fribourg (1481). Only in 1803 with the accession of the cantons of Ticino, Grisons and Vaud did the confederation become linguistically diversified into four languages (not counting dialects). The French language group was strengthened with the last accession event of Valais, Geneva and Neuchâtel in 1815. Most of the integration of the old Swiss Confederacy happened in a monolingual environment. In the last 100 years, the language distribution has remained relatively stable, although a slight increase of the French-speaking and decrease of the German-speaking group is noticeable (see Table 1 .1). In summary, the two main diversification events in Switzerland, religious and linguistic, did not occur at the same time but in two different phases; however, the religious cleavage remained salient throughout the nineteenth century. Whereas religious diversification in the old Swiss Confederacy was violent, linguistic diversification in nineteenthcentury Switzerland was peaceful and driven by political integration.
The EU underwent a much more concentrated diversification process. In eight steps of accession, the EU went from having 4 languages to 24 in a time period of 56 years (between 1957 and 2013) . The 2004 accession of East European countries took the EU from having 10 official languages to 20. The EU is linguistically much more diversified than Switzerland and this diversification happened in a relatively short period of time. In the case of religion, the EU also represents a much more diversified landscape than Switzerland. The EU is predominantly Catholic with 48% of people being self-described Catholics. Protestants account for only 12% (2012) and 6% in the EU (2015). 6 In EU integration, religion has never been a collectively divisive pro-or anti-federalist factor, unlike in Switzerland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To sum up this section, the EU is trying to achieve political integration in the context of a much higher degree of diversity and in much less time than Switzerland.
Figure 1.2 Territorial and population expansion of Switzerland and the EU

ACCOMMODATION OF DIVERSITY
The findings of the previous section raise the question of the stability of what has been achieved in the EU. The EU's main strategy for accommodation of diversity and building of identity has been the facilitation of mobility. In this section, we take a closer comparative look at this strategy and we try to draw lessons for the EU from the Swiss example. To this end, we look at the results of identity formation in Switzerland and the EU. We evaluate the integration strategies by distinguishing two subtypes of citizens: the stayers and the movers. The concept of stayers refers to communities strongly linked to a territory and sharing a common identity among members, based on cultural, religious or civic elements. Territorial communities are protective of their cultural specificity and political autonomy. In Switzerland, these would correspond to the cantons; whereas in the EU, these would correspond to the member states (in some cases to nations within states). We define stayers as the Swiss/EU citizens who live in their canton/member state of origin. The movers are the intra-mobile Swiss/EU citizens within Switzerland/the EU. Among the several problems imputed to the EU is the lack of a common 'we-Europeans' feeling (Delanty, 1997; Fuchs, 2011) . The existence of some shared sense of identity among all communities with the federal/ supranational level is argued to be fundamental for political integration. Identity appears to be necessary to accept the rules of recognition and the law as binding, and as a derivation of this, to ensure that all citizens perceive they are not discriminated against by arbitrary decisions of the government. Identity is also important to promote solidarity among the different peoples and, consequently, ensure at least minimally redistributive institutions (Johnston et al., 2010) . Although there is much discussion today on which type of identity is needed at the European level (Kantner, 2006; Antonsich, 2012; Nicolaïdis, 2012) , the recent crises bring into the cold light of day the fact that the EU project depends on identity feelings under any reasonable guise.
At different points in time both Switzerland and the EU have adopted a strategy to build a common identity, in line with most nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Given the lack of a cultural nation, in Switzerland, as in the EU, identity formation needs to be based on the idea of common civic culture (Chollet, 2011; Wimmer, 2011; Zimmer, 2011) . Indeed, because of its multicultural composition, Swiss identity had to be compatible with the identities of all other communities within the Swiss territory. As a consequence, Switzerland developed a civic and multilevel identity.
Swiss Identity
Swiss identity developed in a multi-ethnic form, as a consequence of transnational contacts of civic associations. From the 1880s, though, a state-centred identity began to form (Zimmer, 2003) . From then on, Swiss identity was more strongly promoted by the elites (Wimmer, 2011, p. 731) . Nationalism along linguistic fault lines emerged during the First World War. But the federal government was able to reconcile the different communities (partly by naming a third French speaker as part of the government). Swiss identity has been rooted in federalism, direct democracy and neutrality, and supported by foundational myths (Froidevaux, 1997) . Remarkably, the same institutional features that favoured the union of several cantons into a single confederacy have been incorporated as part of Swiss identity. As a consequence, Swiss identity was perfectly compatible with cantonal and communal identities.
[Swiss] citizens are welded together by a common political culture, i.e. by a common attachment to a set of fundamental political principles, institutions and voting procedures -most notably [. . .] federalism and direct democracy, and in addition, neutrality -buttressed by a set of myths about past heroic struggles to defend these principles against outside aggressors. ( Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008, p. 11) In the 1990s, critical voices started to be heard regarding Swiss identity (Chollet, 2011, p. 748; Söderström, 2001) . Swiss neutrality was put into question and some sectors of the population started to promote accession to the EU (Fleiner, 2002; Linder and Steffen, 2007) . 7 Internally, economic and social differences between cantons persisted despite the financial compensation schemes of the federation (Lévy, 2007) . Demographic shifts between cantons also became increasingly problematic for the federal system (Vatter, 2007, p. 96; Bochsler, Hänggli and Häusermann, 2015) .
Despite the difficulties mentioned, Figure 1 .3 shows that national identity is stronger than cantonal and local identities for any of the points in time between 2003 and 2011. 8 Swiss citizens identify primarily with the federal level, and then with the regional, cantonal and local levels -in this order. Interestingly, though, the four identities develop simultaneously and are fully compatible, since mean levels of attachment for all four territorial levels are above 3 (the 'quite attached' category). As it appears, Switzerland has been successful in achieving federal identity. Not only have ethnic identities (local/canton/regional) been complemented by a civic identity at the federal level, but Swiss identity has also become the primary level of attachment for most Swiss citizens.
EU Identity
As in Switzerland, European identity was intended to be civic. This identity was not supposed to replace national or regional identities. Quite the contrary, it was presumed to complement ethnic national identities. Identity formation was mainly top-down from the institutional elites, with little participation of the European citizens. So far, the European case appears to be much less successful than the Swiss one (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; McLaren, 2007; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014) . European citizens who have added European to their multilevel identity. Less than 10% of Europeans identify primarily with the European level.
And even though about 50% of the Europeans have incorporated the European identity as another level of identification (together with the national level), almost half of the European population identify exclusively with their national level. The percentage of citizens who identify both with the country and the EU is roughly the same in 1992, with 12 member states, and 2012, with 27 member states. While identification with the EU was already quite high when the EU was created, it is striking that being part of the EU does not apparently boost affective support for the EU. Whereas in the Swiss case federal identity appears as complementary to the cantonal and local identities, in the EU there is still a considerable disconnect between the different territorial levels. primarily to the country and local levels, 9 and feel at best 'not very attached' to the European level. Most EU policies that have been directly or indirectly aimed at promoting EU identity have included the promotion of mobility (Erasmus, Europe 2020 strategy on promoting labour mobility, etc.). Table 1 .2 provides some optimism in this regard: the younger the Europeans, the more they tend to feel European. It remains an open question whether this trend will last in the long run. Figure 1 .6 presents levels of attachment to the EU (see Figure 1 .5 for the mean level of attachment to different territorial levels) together with citizens' perceptions of EU responsiveness (how well the interests of the country are taken into account) and political self-efficacy in the EU (how much citizens' voices count in the EU). The figure is organised according to mean levels of attachment to the EU. In general, the EU receives bad evaluations in relation to responsiveness. In most countries, the majority of respondents disagree that the interests of the country are well taken into account by the EU. And the evaluations are even more negative in relation to political self-efficacy at the European level. Yet, in a number of countries, citizens are modestly positive about EU institutions' responsiveness 9 In some countries, levels of attachment to the regional level are stronger than to the country level, but this is not reflected in this analysis. to national interests (mean above 2.5). Citizens' positive perceptions about EU responsiveness do not correspond to stronger identification with the EU in all these countries. In addition, in all the countries except Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom, perceptions on EU responsiveness are negative as compared to attachment to the EU -that is, mean levels of attachment are always greater than mean evaluations of EU responsiveness. Apparently, and contrary to the Swiss case, EU identity evolves independently of the institutional arena. This makes it difficult to promote identity via existing institutions and policies (EU Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice).
The Stayers
In order to compare strategies for accommodation of diversity, we now focus on mobility promotion, and first on the category of stayers. Table 1 .3 presents the characteristics of the stayers in the EU and Switzerland. There is some similarity between the two cases. Identity is primarily based on ethnic-linguistic-religious elements (although it depends on the specific community) and tends to be strong at the canton/country level. There is neither a common language nor a common ethnic or religious background among all communities; these tend to be mainly territorialised in both contexts. Yet, there is much more heterogeneity within the EU, since the number of communities (without counting regional and local ones) is seven times bigger in the EU than in Switzerland. Linguistic diversity is also deeper in the EU, with 24 official languages. 
Swiss Citizenship Rooted in the Municipality
The Swiss constitution (Art. 37) grants citizenship to any person who is a citizen of a Swiss city. This particularity of Swiss citizenship implies that there are three levels of citizenship, which correspond to the three territorial levels: federal, cantonal and municipal. A person is recognised as a citizen at the federal level if he or she holds citizenship at the municipal level according to municipal and cantonal laws. Swiss citizenship distinguishes between the hometown and the place of residence. Social rights and corresponding duties were attached to the hometown in order to establish which city had to take care of an individual in need and to avoid internal welfare migration to the most generous cities. Nowadays, the city of origin is only in charge of all registers related to a person (Church and Dardanelli, 2005, p. 173) , the duty of assistance is with the city of residence (Art. 115 Swiss Constitution). In some cantons, rights derived from the hometown citizenship have survived until today. 10 Swiss nationality is based on ius sanguinis 11 (Art. 38 Swiss Constitution; enlarged as 'filiation, marriage or adoption'). A child becomes Swiss provided that at least one of the parents has Swiss nationality (Art. 1 of the Federal Law on Acquisition and Loss of Swiss Nationality 1954 Nationality , 2003 . The federation sets up minimum requirements for naturalisation, but the cantons and municipalities are free to add additional requirements for naturalisation in their canton and municipality. Therefore, the naturalisation requirements differ widely between cantons and even between municipalities within most cantons (Wichman, 2013) . It is possible to hold several citizenships at the same time (from different cities and cantons) through acquisition, renunciation or reintegration, provided that cantonal and communal laws are fulfilled. 12 Unlike Switzerland, most national citizenship regimes in Europe grant citizenship at the national level. However, the Swiss citizenship regime presents some similarities with the EU: the members of the union -the cantons or member states -have the main prerogatives on citizenship. Unlike the EU's citizenship regime, however, the Swiss federal regime has not focused on mobility, although it guarantees the latter in a formal sense. The following passages show that, contrary to the EU, neither has the Swiss state actively promoted internal mobility of Swiss citizens, nor is Swiss identity based on the mobility of movers across the territory.
The Movers
The right to move freely and live anywhere in Switzerland is a basic right of Swiss citizens (Art. 24 Swiss Constitution). Cantons and cities are obliged to authorise any Swiss citizen to reside in their territory; cantons and cities are forbidden to restrict or impede the change of residence to another canton or city or to a foreign country. Freedom of movement can be limited on legal grounds if it is in the public interest and if the principle 10 More information can be found at http://www.svbk.ch/ [Accessed 16 . 11 Swiss citizenship is closer to the German tradition in this respect than to the French one, which is based on ius soli.
12 See, for example, the canton of Geneva: http://www.ge.ch/naturalisations/naturalisation-confederes/ [Accessed 16 . of proportionality is respected. 13 In the following paragraphs, we try to provide a picture of the patterns of Swiss intra-mobility -the movers in our wording. How similar/different are these to EU intra-mobility? And how difficult is it to move across Switzerland?
When dealing with internal mobility in Switzerland, a fundamental distinction between commuters and movers needs to be made. Indeed, mobility is very high in Switzerland, but it does not imply changes of residence from one canton to another (movers). The large bulk of mobile citizens are commuters, who travel every day to their workplace but do not change their place of residence.
According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2014), 9 out of 10 active persons commute to their place of work (around 3.7 million people). 14 Of these, 65% commute to another municipality or canton (about 2.6 million people), without actually changing residence. Thirty-two per cent of commuters (1.2 million people) spend more than 30 minutes travelling to the workplace (10% spend more than 60 minutes in reaching their place of work). If we consider that travel distances are short in Switzerland (travelling from Zurich to Bern by train takes 58 minutes), the numbers indicate that many Swiss work in a canton different from their canton of residence. 15 The wellfunctioning transportation network makes it easy for many Swiss to commute from one canton to another without changing residence. Long-distance commuters are principally Swiss men, between 25 and 44 years old, who have tertiary education levels and full-time jobs. This indicates that commuting is related to professional mobility, while keeping the family home stable.
Compared to the number of commuters, the number of movers is comparatively small. 14 The number has increased significantly in the last 12 years, whereas the number of noncommuters has decreased. The percentage of intercantonal commuters has also increased by 7% from 1990 to 2012 (according to information obtained from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2014). 15 The numbers are even greater if we consider Swiss citizens who study in a canton different from their place of residence.
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To summarise, while commuting in Switzerland is commonplace, the percentage of movers who decide to live in another canton is low. Only around 1% of Swiss citizens changed their canton of residence in 2013, a percentage much lower than that of the EU citizens who have moved 
Figure 1.8 Net internal mobility rates (arrivals-departures) of movers (a) and commuters (b)
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Difficulties for the Swiss Movers
In Switzerland, the barriers to mobility have in the main part not been removed by centralistic intervention because they are at the same time constitutive elements of Swiss identity. To start with, even if Switzerland is classically considered a single market, homogeneity is far from attained in the Swiss system. 'In fact, several factors play the role of powerful barriers to spatial mobility in Switzerland and divide the country into several markets for labour with different demand and supply conditions' (Filippini, 1998, p. 51) . Federalism constitutes a barrier to Swiss mobility and at the same time a marker of common identity. Most competencies are in the hands of the cantons and they differ from one another in educational, social and taxing policies, three of the main aspects which a citizen or family needs to first deal with when moving to another canton. Swiss federalism fosters residential immobility, as most policies (and particularly those related to family and child rearing) are determined at the municipal and cantonal levels. Moving to a different canton means most of the time adapting to a completely new system (Filippini, 1998, p. 53) . Cantonal regulation also reaches liberal professions, sometimes precluding citizens from moving to another canton. This is the case for lawyers, medical doctors or architects, for example, against which there is still strong cantonal protectionism. For some liberal professions, cantons can issue regulations which in fact act as protectoral barriers for the professionals residing in the canton (Filippini, 1998, p. 53) . A recent Eurobarometer survey in 2010 (Eurobarometer 72.5) reveals that one of the main obstacles EU citizens face when moving to another EU country is language. This might also, therefore, be the most important disincentive for Swiss citizens to move to another canton. In fact, one can see that Swiss citizens tend to move to cantons that are closer to their canton of origin, and where the same language is spoken. The population is mostly monolingual. Therefore, moving from one canton to another where a different language is spoken might be burdensome. Since the use of a specific language is perpetuated by the cantonal school system, moving to a canton where a different language is spoken might be even more difficult for families with school-age children (see Table 1 .4).
Housing is also a problem that Swiss citizens face when moving to another canton. The difficulty of finding a house in big urban areas and agglomerations had first been put into question in the post-war period (Filippini, 1998) and seems to be a persistent difficulty which still today shapes decisions whether to move by Swiss citizens (Viry and Kaufman, 2015) . This fact, together with the efficient transportation network, favours commuting over change of residence (Viry and Kaufman, 2015, p. 35) . Last but not least, a number of administrative burdens might discourage Swiss citizens from moving. A website of the Swiss Federal Administration at the service of citizens who want to move to another canton, proves indeed that the 'to dos' constitute a long list (see https://www.ch.ch/fr/demenagement/ [Accessed 16 ).
Movers describe themselves in general as more discriminated against on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, handicap, origin or skin-colour than stayers, which might underlie the different problems Swiss movers encounter across Switzerland (Table 1.5). It is only in relation to income that all the movers feel less discriminated against than the stayers, reflecting their higher levels of education. Except for the Italian movers, movers feel on average less discriminated against than the stayers.
Taking a look back at the second section of this chapter, the following observation can be made. The protection of strong local identities via federalism, autonomy of the municipality, together with direct democracy closely tied to citizen debate in a common language constitute Swiss identity. It is these same elements that discourage internal mobility.
Solutions for Swiss Movers
Contrary to the EU, the Swiss federal state has not actively promoted moving across cantons. Only in recent history have some actions been taken at the federal level in order to facilitate internal mobility. Many concern commuting as much as moving. The Swiss federal state has tried to facilitate homogenisation of cantonal laws in order to not hinder labour mobility. This is the case, for example, with professional mobility (Art. 1, Federal Law on Internal Market, 1995). The law was later modified in 2006 by increasing the transferability of cantonal decisions to the whole Swiss territory, the Swiss version of Cassis de Dijon (Federal Law on Internal Market, 1995 and the EU on freedom of movement was signed in 2002, in order to ensure that Swiss citizens would not be discriminated against versus EU movers. 16 As for the school system, the Swiss constitution was reformed in 2006 in order to coordinate the education system of the different cantons. The main objective was to promote the creation of a homogenous Swiss space of professional formation for the whole territory, which would facilitate intercantonal mobility through harmonisation of the cantonal education systems (Parliamentary initiative, Constitutional Article on Education, June 2005). 17 Further legislation strengthened coordination of the education system. 18 But the guiding principle is formal coordination, not homogenisation of language and content. Although the tax system was also modified recently, these changes only affect EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) citizens residing in Switzerland. 19 Still today there is a debate on which languages should be taught at school (according to information obtained from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2000). Despite the efforts taken by the federal state to eliminate obstacles to mobility, the truth is that few Swiss decide to move to other cantons. Swiss identity is not built on mobility.
LESSONS FOR THE EU
Politics over Time
EU integration is trying to achieve more political integration and accommodate a much higher degree of diversity in much less time than has ever been the case in Switzerland. Integration and expansion processes that were slower and non-linear in Switzerland and that happened in separate phases (religious diversification, linguistic diversification, etc.) are all going on at the same time in the EU and at an accelerated pace. Political integration and accession with enormous shocks of diversification are engineered at the same time in the EU. The speed and intergovernmental method of European integration has been marked by relative success in times of peace, stability and economic growth. But what has been achieved seems to be unstable during a time of crisis, as the rise of anti-EU sentiment and Brexit show.
Citizenship in the City
The EU has adopted a structure in which each member state retains a major part of the necessary competences. From this perspective, the institutional design of the EU seems to echo quite well the federal-state formation process in Switzerland. The following precisions are however necessary in the comparative perspective. Due to the greater diversity of the EU, this quasi-federal system has derived from extreme asymmetries between the member states. Since EU identity is not well entrenched among European citizens, it is hard to design institutions and policies of common territorial protection and redistribution and there is mistrust towards centralistic EU institutions. Most European citizens do not feel that their interests are taken into account by the EU. It is also important to note that in Swiss federalism, the municipalities play an important role; they are much more than just administrative districts. The city is the first site of citizenship. The city is also the first site of direct democracy and an important provider of social security. Citizens practise direct democracy first and foremost in their city, dealing with topics that are directly accessible to them. This city-centred and bottom-up construct of citizenship is guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution. Citizens feel that their most immediate and local identity is not jeopardised but rooted in and guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution. Serious consideration ought to be given to the idea that European citizenship is not only about bringing citizenship to a higher European level but also about bringing European citizenship more to the root-level of citizenship: the city. This includes competencies of the city in matters of granting citizenship and collecting taxes, responsibilities of the city in educational, social and cultural matters, and a bundle of political rights of direct participation and civic duties of every person as a citizen of a city. On a small scale, Switzerland offers an example of how the old city-centred concept of citizenship can be accommodated in the context of political integration, trans-nationalisation and trans-border mobility.
Direct Democracy
Direct democracy has indeed acted as an ex post federator in the Swiss context. Switzerland made direct democracy and direct democracy made Switzerland. There has been a slow process of adaptation of structurally similar institutions of direct democracy at all levels (communal, cantonal, federal) by all units (all communes, all cantons, the confederation roughly between 1830 and 1891). The EU is only incipiently in a process of introducing direct democracy (in some member states and through the European Citizen Initiative), and so far direct democracy is mainly practised as national plebiscitary democracy. Under this guise, it is seen as a threat to EU integration and probably not without good reason. 20 However, direct democracy was a structural feature of the conservative anti-federalist cantons in Switzerland in the early nineteenth century. While in Switzerland the systemically coherent introduction of direct democracy at all levels of the polity in the long run served as an important unifier, direct democracy has not even been considered at the European level.
Common Identity without Real Mobility
The analysis of identity and mobility in Switzerland shows that the former has been achieved without the latter. Swiss identity is gained by constitutional and informal good-faith guarantees for the stayers via local and cantonal autonomy, and only reluctant promotion of the movers. Mobility rights are complete but remain formal, and the constitutional design of Switzerland favours the consolidation of the linguistic and cultural communities of the stayers while facilitating commuting (as opposed to moving). The one element on which the EU has most forcefully based the construction of EU citizenship and identity -mobility of residence -has been discouraged in Switzerland. There is in fact a trade-off in the Swiss case between multiculturalism and intra-mobility of residence that might help to better understand which course is to be followed at the European level. The institutional design as incorporated in Swiss multicultural identity (which aims fundamentally at the protection of cantonal and local autonomy, culture and language) has facilitated Switzerland being called today a successful multicultural society. Most citizens identify with Switzerland as a country, but they do not want to take advantage of their formal right to move to other parts of the country, especially not across language borders. The same institutional design that has made Switzerland a success in terms of multiculturalism and democracy poses important barriers that make it difficult for the Swiss to move their residence across cantonal borders. The Swiss compromise between the formal right and economic necessity of mobility, on the one hand, and the protection of political and cultural sub-identities, on the other, is commuting. Due to its vast size, commuting is of limited applicability to the EU, but it is not impossible. In a Europe of high-speed trains and low-cost air travel, and of cities and trans-border regions, commuting is important. In any case, it might be advisable for the EU to consolidate its project by securitising the stayers via more solid guarantees of autonomy. Freedom of movement is to be safeguarded as a formal right. But promotion of mobility via material equalisation of all positive dimensions of rights leading to the perception of threat to the local and national autonomies and welfare arrangements of the stayers will most likely contribute to the erosion of EU identity, not to its formation.
